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The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory
George P. Fletcher
These are good times-at least for the theory of criminal
law. This special issue of Buffalo Criminal Law Review tes-
tifies to a remarkable surge of interest among younger
scholars in perennial questions: Why should we punish of-
fenders? Do we require a human act as a precondition for
liability and what is its structure? What does it mean for
someone to be guilty or culpable for committing an offense?
How do we avoid contradictions in structuring the criteria
of liability? The time has come for renewed intensity in
pondering and discussing these basic issues.
The contributions of this symposium follow hard on a
spate of publications testifying to the revival of the field
that I vaguely call "criminal theory." Michael Moore's prop-
erly celebrated 1993 book, Act and Crime, has brought to
bear an entirely new body of literature on action theory to
the analysis of the act requirement in different contexts.'
Paul Robinson has several new and important books on the
market.2 Significantly, we are witnessing more and more
young scholars devoting their energies to the perennial
questions at the foundations of criminal liability. "Criminal
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
1. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL LAW (1993). See the symposium devoted to this
book in 142 U. PA. L. REV. (1994).
2. PAUL ROBINSON, STRUCTIURE AND FUNCTION IN CRMINAL LAW (1997);
PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW (1997); JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
3. Major theoretical contributions of the last few years by younger American
scholars in the field of substantive criminal law include Anne M. Coughlin,
Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995); Dan M. Kaban & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1996); Russell Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of
the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229 (1995);
Anthony Dillof, Punishing Bias:An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of
Bias Crime Statutes, 91Nw. U. L. REv. 1015 (1997).
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theory" is defined by a commitment to probe the philosophi-
cal foundations of crime and punishment. You would think
that in a country that houses over a million and half people
in its prisons, this field would be of natural interest. In fact
the issues of policy and justice that define criminal justice
have gone remarkably unnoticed in the last two decades.
For a variety of reasons, research and philosophical reflec-
tion on the criminal law declined in the 1980s and early
1990s.
If we look back three decades we encounter a different
picture. In the mid-1960s criminal justice ranked among
the premier subjects of the law school curriculum. As stu-
dents now discuss feminism and originalism in constitu-
tional interpretation, the reigning question of the 1960s
was the confrontation of the state and the individual in the
field of criminal justice. Every thoughtful graduate yearned
for literacy in the then current decisions of the progressive
Supreme Court and in the reformist ambitions of the 1962
Model Penal Code. To be educated in law meant that among
other things, one pondered the future of criminal justice in
the United States.
The fall and rise of criminal theory in the United States
cries out for an explanation. Can we explain the decline?
And what path should the new found emphasis on criminal
theory take in the next several decades? These are the
questions I have set for myself in this introduction to the
Buffalo Criminal Law Review symposium on criminal the-
ory.
This international and comparative character of the ar-
ticles collected in this symposium aids our understanding of
the American situation. We are not alone in the revival of
philosophical interest in the criminal law. We see a similar
pattern among younger scholars in Israel and England and
a searching for issues of theoretical interest in Germany.
The synergy of these scholars coming together for the first
time in a single language and within the bounds of a single
law review bodes well for the future of criminal theory as
an international discipline.
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In this upbeat moment it is worth reflecting on the fac-
tors producing the fall and contemporary rise of criminal
theory.
I. THE TRENDS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S
In the 1960s and the 1970s the theory of criminal law
found its primary stimulus not only in the work of the
Model Penal Code and in the decisions of the Supreme
Court but in the reflections of moral philosophers, some of
whom were trained as lawyers and others not. Worthy of
special mention are the contributions by H.L.A. Hart," Her-
bert Morris,5 Richard Wasserstrom,6 Herbert Fingarette,'
Joel Feinberg,' Robert Nozick, and Judith Jarvis
Thomson."° When I first began writing about criminal law, I
could draw on this remarkable body of newly-minted intel-
lectual capital. A community of serious people had invested
their energies in the reflective reconsideration of the basic
issues of criminal responsibility.
Criminal theory began to decline in the mid-1970s." The
curricular and research primacy of criminal justice came to
be threatened on all sides. The Supreme Court under the
leadership of Warren Burger and William Rehnquist cur-
tailed its expansion of constitutional procedural protection
and began a slow process of retrenchment. Also, by the end of
the 1970s the wave of state criminal law reform had passed.
4. See ILLA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
5. See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (1976).
6. See Richard Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 731 (1960).
7. See HERBERT FINGARERTE & ANN F. HASSE, MENTAL DISABIlITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979); HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF
CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972).
8. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOINGAND DESERVING (1970).
9. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) [hereinafter
ANARACHY]; PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
10. See the reprint of Thomson's earlier essays in JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON,
THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990).
11. I confess that my own book RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978) received
much more attention than I expected.
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The Model Penal Code ceased being a stimulus to new legis-
lation and became instead a dogmatic resource for teaching
criminal law. The Code contained definitive positions on the
meaning of purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negli-
gence,' the nature of necessity and self-defense," and the
relevance of mistakes both of fact and of law.' With these
problems seemingly solved in codified black letter, there
was little impulse to think through these issues anew.
By the mid-1980s the signs of trouble became apparent.
New modes of theoretical were on the rise, and with few
exceptions they had little to offer the theory of criminal law.
The Law and Economics movement was winning new ad-
herents everywhere, and it had little insight to offer on the
old fashioned issues of guilt and punishment. From the
vantage point of criminology and moral philosophy, the
economists made all the wrong assumptions. First, they
assumed that all sanctions were simply prices that actors
pay for engaging in their preferred conduct. Philosophers
had always stressed the expressive and condemnatory na-
ture of punishment,'T a factor that simply fell beyond the
economist's ken. Further, economists assumed that poten-
tial criminals made rational calculations about whether
committing a crime was worthy of their time and trouble.
This simple minded view of criminal conduct could only
make criminologists smile. In the end, despite some good
faith efforts, those interested in economic analysis of law
simply had to ignore the complications of criminal justice.
The critical legal studies movement fared no better. Ex-
cept for one article by Mark Kelman 6 the "crits" had al-
12. AMERICAN LAW INSnITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES
§ 2.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
13. Id. §§ 3.02,3.04.
14. Id. §§ 2.04,3.09.
15. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 THE
MONIST 397 (1965); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in
RETRIBUTIVISM AND rrS CRrTICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Herbert Morris, A
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981).
16. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981).
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most nothing to say about criminal justice. This was, in
fact, surprising. A leftist Marxist criminology was available
for borrowing from France and Germany, but this critique
of crime as a product of Capitalist society never seemed to
catch on in the United States.
The only academic movement of the 1980s that made an
impact on criminal law was feminism. With her taboo-
shattering article, Susan Estrich pinioned the field of rape
for critical reassessment.17 Since then numerous feminist
critiques have emerged of the discriminatory treatment of
women in the criminal law. The introduction of a "battered
women's defense" led to sustained inquiry on the founda-
tions of self-defense, particularly the importance of the re-
quirement that the defender be subject to an "imminent
risk" of attack.' The defense of provocation has also re-
ceived its share of debunking criticism, the claim being that
the cultural assumptions underlying the defense favor the
defense of men who kill women rather than of women who
kill men.' The feminist critique of criminal justice was
surely long overdue-though there may be dangers now of
ideological excess.' Capital punishment also poses a field
for sexist critiques, both as it affects women and men. As
typified in the O.J. Simpson case, prosecutors rarely de-
mand the death penalty when men kill their wives or for-
mer wives. At the same time, the death penalty is rarely
applied against female murderers-a pattern of discrimi-
nation against men that is rarely voiced.2' There are un-
doubtedly patterns of discrimination in the law that require
exposure and correction. Whether this remains an arena for
long-range study and publication remains to be seen.
17. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
18. For a critical assessment of the battered woman's defense, see Coughlin,
supra note 3.
19. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
20. See my critique of the trial of Mike Tyson in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH
JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRLs 120-31 (1995).
21. For a critique of the Soviet proposal (later adopted as law in Russia) to
eliminate the death penalty against women as a matter of law, see George P.
Fletcher, On Trial in Gorbachev's Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 13 (May 18,1989).
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With the major exception of feminism, then, the intellec-
tual trends of the 1980s did little to make criminal law at-
tractive to ambitious young scholars looking for new and
fashionable methods of argument. For good or for ill, noviti-
ates avoided the field. Major law schools-such as Harvard,
Yale, Michigan, Stanford-appointed younger faculty who
started teaching criminal law without any interest in
probing the philosophical foundations of criminal law. By
the early 1990s, one could say, with sadness, that there was
virtually no one under forty writing in the field.
II. CRIMINAL THEORY AND TORT THEORY
The decline of criminal theory during the latter period
stands in useful contrast to the rise of tort theory, a field
that in my view was born of the challenge posed by the eco-
nomic analysis of law. The question was whether the Kal-
dor/Hicks test and the principle of efficiency could properly
displace criteria of justice in allocating tort liability.' Two
articles, published in the early 1970s, struck back against
the emergent paradigm of economic efficiency.' The leader
of the economist camp, Guido Calabresi, then felt compelled
to respond and defend his views on the primacy of economic
efficiency.' The anti-efficiency, pro-justice literature came
to group itself under the rubric "corrective justice." Ernest
Weinrib and Jules Coleman became leaders of the justice
camp, each eventually producing a book length statement of
their position.' The field became attractive to younger
scholars who sensed, quite properly in my view, that these
were issues worth arguing about.
22. For a summary of the arguments, see the chapter "Efficiency" in GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 155-71 (1996).
23. Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537(1972).
24. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
25. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); JULES L.
COLEMAN, RISES AND WRONGS (1992).
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It is fair to say that today, corrective justice represents
an established school in tort law. It has a name, a label, a
"flag" that its adherents can rally behind; it stands for an
important question of value that goes to the heart of private
law. Most importantly, it has a powerful opponent in the
school of economic analysis.
One should not underestimate the importance of articu-
late opponents or intellectual enemies in developing the
profile of an academic field. Positivism needs to attack the
"dogmatism" of natural law, as natural law needs to attack
the "moral arbitrariness" of positivism. The economists
need arcane and inefficient rules to criticize, and corrective
justice could have not have taken off unless the economists
were there to serve as an appropriate and influential target.
The only exception to this general pattern seems to be
feminism. The "enemy" for feminism is not a body of aca-
demic literature, for no one wants to define himself or her-
self as anti-feminist. It would be akin to declaring yourself
opposed to human rights. The enemy for feminist literature
is not an academic school but the sexist practices of the le-
gal system itself.
At this stage of its revival, criminal theory still lacks
many of the characteristics that have led to the develop-
ment of the leading schools of the last two decades. There is
no "flag" like corrective justice to rally behind. Most signifi-
cantly, there is no apparent enemy. Who stands opposed to
the style of argument represented in this remarkable and
insightful collection of essays? The opposition consists not
in an articulated set of views but rather in indifference.
Indifference is an elusive enemy. Policy makers in the
field of criminal justice should pay more attention to aca-
demic criticism. Those who contemplate draconian sanc-
tions like "three strikes and you're out" should heed the ar-
guments of experts who predict what will happen when the
law goes into effect.' But in their day-to-day operation,
26. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? The Peculiar Place of
Experts in the Current Debate About Crime and Justice, 31 CRim. L. BuLL. 305
(1995).
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legislatures and courts pay little heed either to criminolo-
gists or theorists of the criminal law.
The general indifference to theoretical work in the
criminal law accounts for the dreadful state of the case law.
Pause and consider whether there is any opinion in the
leading casebooks that you could take to be reliable or even
plausible exposition of the philosophical foundations of
criminal responsibility. Is there any case about which you
could say? "I am proud to teach a body of law in which these
views are expressed." In tort law, there are many of this
sort--ranging from the classic essay by Justice Cardozo in
Palsgraf ' to the path-breaking exposition by Justice
Traynor in his concurring opinion in Escola' to the
thoughtful arguments of Judge Lehman on the issue of
negligence per se.' Legal opinions of this quality mean that
contemporary tort theorists can write about corrective jus-
tice without distancing themselves entirely from the
teachings of the judiciary. Their views find support and
resonance in the great legal opinions of the last century.
In substantive criminal law, I dare say, there are liter-
ally no opinions of this quality. Or course, we all like to
teach and ponder the situation of cases like Dudley & Ste-
phens' or the Goetz"1 case. And the arcane technical opin-
ions of the California felony murder cases remain a peren-
nial favorite. But could anyone plausibly claim that the
Queens Bench fathomed the depths of criminal responsibil-
ity in Dudley & Stephens or that we really wish to argue on
behalf of a jurisprudence of felony murder? The fact is that
stripped of their power and their judicial robes, these
authors of opinions in the criminal law have very little to
say. They stand to Cardozo's reflections on risk in Palsgraf
as doggerel stands to poetry.
27. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
28. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal.
1944).
29. Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197 (N.Y. 1926).
30. Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273.
31. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
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The puzzle confounds further. The same judges who
write the memorable tort opinions also write opinions in
criminal law. How could they could be so intelligent and
insightful when writing about torts but have so little to say
about the criteria of criminal responsibility? The reason, I
believe, is that the theoretical structures of criminal re-
sponsibility are too weak to resist the political pressures
favoring conviction.' The commitment to do justice buckles
in the face of the potential deterrent advantages of convic-
tion. Accordingly, common law courts remain committed to
very few firm principles in the field of criminal justice. They
impose strict liability. They disregard claims of mistake of
law and even mistakes of fact in cases when a conviction
will send the right "message" to society. They shift the bur-
den of persuasion when it is convenient to do so. They per-
sist in applying catch-all prosecutorial doctrines, such as
the felony-murder rule and vicarious liability for co-
conspirators. Most seriously, the courts refuse to pay heed
to the conceptual tools-such as clarifying the concept of
mens rea (culpability) or distinguishing between justifica-
tion and excuse-that would enable the judiciary to state
robust and compelling principles of liability.
That the American procedural system so clearly favors
defendants makes it difficult to work out fair-minded, even-
handed criteria of criminal responsibility. U.S. Prosecutors
have only one crack at conviction, for in contrast to the
situation on the European Continent and even in Canada,
U.S. prosecutors cannot appeal jury verdicts of not guilty.
This means that judges will deny instructions that might
favor the prosecution, for if the judges err in favor of the
state they can be reversed; if they err in favor of the defense
they cannot be reversed.' As a result, the state receives
32. This may be generally true, but it does not explain judicial monstrosities
favoring acquittal, the leading example of which is D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C.
182.
33. A good example is the refusal of trial judges to eliminate the biased
instructions that permitted juries to infer consent from an alleged rape victim's
prior sexual experience. See FlarcHER, supra note 20, at 108-31.
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compensation for its procedural disadvantages at the level
of substantive law. Strict liability, felony-murder, vicarious
liability, and conspiracy doctrines make it easier to secure a
conviction in the face of the defense's credibly disputing the
factual basis for charges of culpable conduct.
Whether these accounts suffice or not, the fact remains
that the opinions in the field of substantive criminal law
lack educational power. And yet the conventional manner of
teaching criminal law in the United States requires profes-
sors to mull over these second rate disquisitions on criminal
responsibility. Not surprisingly, decades of teaching opin-
ions we do not respect have hardly advanced the refinement
of the general understanding of the criteria of criminal re-
sponsibility. Given the conventions of American law teach-
ing, first year teachers are not likely to turn to intelligent
texts and monographs to improve the level of discourse. The
best alternative to the case method remains the dogmas of
the Model Penal Code.
II. OVERCOMING THE BIASES OF CODIFICATION
The Model Penal Code is not the only code that stifles
theoretical inquiry. Every place you go in the Western
world, you will find a criminal code that lays out the defini-
tions of offenses in the code's "special part" and prescribes
general principles of responsibility in the code's "general
part." Germans are proud of their code enacted in 1975. The
French show off a new 1994 code, as do the Spanish their
1995 innovation. One of the first items of business in the
post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe is to adopt
new criminal codes to reflect their new emphasis on human
rights and the just treatment of criminal suspects.
One consequence of codification is that every country
asserts its own conception of philosophical truth about the
definitions of offenses and the principles for determining
questions of self-defense, necessity, insanity, negligence,
and complicity. The dogmas of the local positive law inhibit
local scholars from probing the philosophical issues that lie
behind the code. The role of scholars is reduced to writing
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commentary on the proper interpretation of the code. At the
most they can propose readings of the official text that suit
their sense of justice, but they cannot approach problems as
philosophical issues to be resolved without being cabined by
authoritative starting points. Further, the parochial nature
of codification discourages the development of an interna-
tional body of scholars all engaged in a conversation about
the same basic issues.
Yet as the world has in fact become more localized in
criminal justice, the contrary aspiration has become
stronger. The talk today in the European Union is of the
"Europeanization" of criminal law. "Globalization" has be-
come the clich6 of the times, but criminal law remains con-
fined and indebted to it nationalist premises.
The thesis of my forthcoming book Basic Concepts of
Criminal Law' is in fact that diverse systems of positive
criminal law already display greater unity than we com-
monly realize. In order to perceive this underlying unity, we
must take a step back from the details and the linguistic
variations of the criminal codes. The unity that emerges is
not on the surface of statutory rules and case law decisions
but in the debates that recur, explicitly and implicitly, in
every legal culture. My claim is that a series of distinctions
shapes and guides the positions taken on doctrinal points in
every system of criminal justice. Whether you start from
the Model Penal Code or the German Criminal Code, you
will inevitably confront disputes about these questions,
such as such as the distinction between substance and pro-
cedure, punishment and treatment, crimes and offenders,
offenses and defenses, intention and negligence, attempts
and completed offenses. A total of twelve distinctions of this
sort constitute the "deep structure" of criminal law all over
the world.
These basic concepts of criminal justice are philosophical
and conceptual in nature. They possess a truth value that
cannot be resolved simply by an act of law-making will. A
34. GEORGE P. FLrcHER, CoNcEPrOs BAsIcOS DE DERECHo PENAL (1997)
(English version forthcoming 1998).
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legislature can no more resolve a philosophical problem
than it can determine a matter of scientific controversy.
There is no way that a code-or case law for that matter-
could decide definitely whether, say, the statute of limita-
tions is substantive or procedural. Nor could a code decide
whether deportation is a criminal sanction, requiring the
full array of procedural measures reserved for criminal tri-
als. These questions require the lawyer or the judge to pon-
der the nature of substantive rules or of punishment and to
assay whether the particular institution is to be classified
as part of the concept or not.
Codes must be understood, therefore, as tentative an-
swers to eternal questions. Scholars must remain commit-
ted to probing the depths of those eternal questions, what-
ever the local code may say on the matter.
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CRIMINAL THEORY
A certain impulse toward revival occurs in any body of
theory when scholars realize that a previously dormant idea
casts their work in a new light. Thus economists gain en-
ergy from the assumption that efficiency shapes and drives
the common law. The "crits" thrive on the notions of inde-
terminateness and hegemonic power implicit in legal doc-
trine. In criminal law, as well, major conceptual reorienta-
tions have advanced the field. This happened at the end of
the 19th and early 20th century in the U.S. and Germany
alike when many theorists and judges thrust the notion of
guilt to the center of their thinking.' All of a sudden they
grasped that guilt or culpability was the issue to which all
other issues related. This insight led in Germany to decades
of debates about the way the various issues were related to
culpability. It lead in the U.S. to the insight that all
"defenses"-for example, self-defense, insanity, duress-
ultimately bore on guilt or culpability. If the prosecution
had to prove guilt beyond a responsible doubt, then it must
35. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); Judgment of May 8,
1894,33 RGZ [Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Cases] 352.
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also prove all matters bearing on guilt to the same degree of
certainty.
Insight comes from bringing to bear a novel way of
thinking to previously settled bodies of law. Today we are
more inclined to think, as I claimed in the introduction to
Rethinking Criminal Law that "criminal law is a species of
moral and political philosophy." This hasty remark might
adventitiously have been correct. It might have presaged a
pattern of interest in exploring the connections between the
criminal law and moral and political philosophy. Surpris-
ingly, this did not come to pass. The omission in the litera-
ture remains to be filled.
Criminal punishment is the most elementary and obvi-
ous expression of the state's sovereign power. One would
expect, therefore, that the theory of punishment and of
criminal law would be high on the agenda of those inter-
ested in the philosophical foundations of the state. In the
contemporary writing on political theory, however, both
criminal law and criminal procedure receive short shrift. A
appealing challenge awaits us in exploring the implications
of libertarianism, liberalism, communitarianism, republi-
canism, and other political theories for the details of crimi-
nal liability. This project requires not only a study of the
relevant political theory but of the technical details of
criminal law.
The criteria of criminal responsibility also provide a
laboratory for testing sensibilities of moral right and wrong.
The utilitarians and Kantians have in fact had much to say
about the rationale for punishment. Virtue theorists have
recently offered us a more subtle account of culpability.'
Yet philosophical training provides no assurance of wis-
dom. I will discuss two examples that illustrate philosophi-
cal thinking gone awry. I present these views here in order
to make an important point about the revival of criminal
theory. No revival occurs without debate. Though I regard
the views I shall discuss as wrong, they are nonetheless
plausible and thoughtful positions. They warrant credit for
36. See Huigens, supra note 3; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 3.
288 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAWREVIEW [Vol.1:275
providing the stimulus for ongoing debate about the foun-
dations of liability.
The two examples pose perennial puzzles in criminal
theory. The first is the problem whether completed offenses
should be punished more severely than attempts. And the
second is whether a coherent distinction obtains between
causing harm and letting it happen. The latter problem is
often termed the problem of distinguishing between acts
and omissions.
Philosophers and philosophically minded lawyers often
argue that attempts should be punished the same as com-
pleted acts. There is no difference, they maintain, in the
culpability of someone who shoots and kills and someone
who shoots and misses. 7 Culpability is expressed in control,
and, the argument is, the shooter has ultimately no control
over the path of the bullet. What happens after the bullet
leaves the gun is a matter of fortuity and therefore not
properly laid to his charge. There is something plausible
about this view, although in fact people do regard them-
selves as responsible only for the harm they cause-and not
the harm they intend or the harm they nearly cause. If a
modern day Raskolnikov suffered paralyzing guilt for put-
ting poison in the drink that his intended victim never
touched, one would wonder about his mental stability.
Those who favor the principled equivalence of attempts
and caused harms might respond that those who intend and
try to bring about harm ought to feel just as guilty as those
who actually do bring it about. This claim of "ought" merely
restates the view that culpability is based on control and no
one has control over the causal sequence that connects one's
actions to the occurrence of harm.
The mistake in the equivalence thesis (trying to kill =
actually killing) is ignoring that culpability in law is rele-
vant only as it relates to wrongdoing. To be more precise, if
37. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DFSERVING (1970); Sanford Kadish,
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1501
(1994).
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culpability is a function of wrongdoing, then the following
syllogism applies:
1) If the wrong is greater, the culpability is greater.
2) The harm and therefore the wrong of killing is
greater than the wrong of attempting to kill.
3) Therefore, the culpability for killing is greater
than the culpability for attempting to kill.
The problem, then, is establishing that in law the only form
of relevant culpability is culpability for wrongdoing. The
way to grasp this proposition is to see it as a problem of po-
litical as well as moral philosophy.
Punishment for crime becomes defensible as a matter of
political theory only if the actor has done something to en-
croach upon the commoA sphere, the public space. This en-
croachment could be defined, as John Stuart Mill defined it,
as causing harm to others,' or it could be understood as
violating the rights of the community to order and security.
Actions are wrong-or represent wrongdoing-when they
encroach in this way on the rights of others or the shared
public interest in security.
The political philosophy standing behind this proposition
would be liberal or libertarian. It recognizes the distinction
between the private and public spheres, the purpose of
criminal punishment being solely to safeguard the public
sphere. However bad our thoughts in the private sphere,
they do not constitute a justification for the state's interven-
ing in our lives, subjecting us to trial, and imposing pun-
ishment on us as though the evil that lurks in our hearts
were the business of all.
The proper way to think about criminal liability, there-
fore, is to recognize the lexical ordering of wrongdoing, re-
sponsibility, and culpability (or guilt). As Robert Nozick
captured the ordering: C = W times r, where W stands for
wrongdoing, r for the degree of personal responsibility, and
C for the level of culpability. W increases with the level or
38. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859).
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harm or proximity of the threat of harm;" r varies between
0 and 1. It is lower for negligently risking harm than for
intentionally bringing it about. In the case of excuses, r is
reduced to 0.
Several implications follow from this liberal approach to
criminal responsibility. First, as I have argued, because W
is greater for actually causing harm, C for completed crimes
is greater than for attempted crimes. Further, because
wrongdoing is indispensable, there should be no criminal
liability in cases of impossible attempts where the action
itself is wholly innocuous. The standard example is mistak-
ing sugar for cyanide and putting a large dosage in the cof-
fee of someone you want to kill. The action consists in put-
ting sugar in coffee with the intent to kill. The Model Penal
Code section 5.01 recognizes liability in this case, as does
the German Criminal Code section 22. The rationale for
liability is that by acting on his wicked intent, the actor
shows himself to be dangerous. Despite the influence of the
German law on the Continent, the overwhelming trend of
Continental jurisdictions is to hold fast to the liberal prin-
ciple that culpability presupposes external wrongdoing that
actually encroaches upon the rights of others.4'
Philosophers who have argued in favor of the equiva-
lence thesis have ignored the interplay in this context of
moral and political philosophy. They assume, it seems, that
the problem of criminal punishment depends solely on
moral responsibility, and that moral responsibility is some-
thing that occurs in the realm of intending. Whether they
are right or wrong on the moral point, they simply disre-
gard the significance of punishment as an act of state power
and the necessity of justifying punishment as an interven-
tion of public authority in the lives of free individuals.
39. NOZICK, supra note 9, at 60-63 (the original formula was R=r x H, where
R is the quantity of deserved punishment and H is the amount of harm).
40. This proposition, if accepted, has powerful implications. For a recent
application in the field of hate crimes, see Dillof, supra note 3.
41. The trend is typified by the new Spanish Criminal Code, which returns to
the liberal principle in a deliberate rejection of the fascist past. See SPANISH CIVIL
CODE § 16 (1).
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A second conundrum reflecting similar confusion attends
the effort to distinguish between actions and omissions.
This problem often gets confused with the nature of human
action.' But the issue is not action versus inaction, for de-
cisions to remain passive also reflect human agency. The
issue is properly expressed as the opposition of letting harm
occur and bringing about harm by assertive action. The
question is whether if someone stands by as another suf-
fers, the wrongdoing of failing to intervene and arrest the
suffering is as bad as actually causing it. It seems to me
fairly obvious that the wrongdoing of causing harm (say,
actually drowning someone with your own hands) is much
greater than merely standing by and failing to intervene to
prevent it (passively observing the drowning). But there are
at least three lines of thought that support skepticism
about the distinction:
A) A consequentialist, particularly utilitarian
analysis of acts and omissions would render acts and
omissions equivalent: they both have the same con-
sequences.
B) A strictly moral, subjectively focused assess-
ment would also render acts and omissions equiva-
lent. After all, if culpability is located in intentions
(as argued above in favor of the equivalence theory
of attempts), then the intention of the person who
stands by and fails to intervene might be just as
wicked as that of the person who kills with his own
hands. Immanuel Kant argued that failing to rescue
others violated the categorical imperative.'
C) In controverted cases, the distinction loses its
grip and it becomes almost impossible to achieve
consensus on classifying the case. For example, is
turning off a respirator an act of killing (action) or of
42. See generally MOORE, supra note 1. For my critique of Moore's view of
omissions, see George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 1443 (1994).
43. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK TO THE METAPHYSICS OF MORAIs 17-22
(Herbert James Paton trans., 1962).
292 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.1:275
letting die (omission)? Difficulties in borderline cases
induces skepticism about the distinction in general.
This a powerful confluence of forces, enough to make one
wonder why the law holds so firmly to the distinction. And
lately many people have argued that the law should aban-
don the distinction as morally irrelevant.
Skepticism about acts and omissions surfaced recently in
the dispute about assisted suicide. The conventional way of
thinking about Dr. Kevorkian's death mask is that provid-
ing the mask to terminally ill patients (allowing them to
pull the fatal string) differs fundamentally from the pa-
tient's refusing medical care necessary to stay alive. The
former is an act facilitating suicide, the latter is a mere re-
fusal to accept treatment, an omission. As a result, all
states-with the once disputed exception of Oregon"-allow
patients to refuse treatment but explicitly prohibit medi-
cally assisted suicide.
Critics argue that this distinction is irrational. There
should be no difference, they say, between acts "aiming at
death" and omissions "aiming at death." Ronald Dworkin
recently led a distinguished group of philosophers in writ-
ing a Philosophers' Brief in Supreme Court litigation on the
constitutionality of prohibiting assisted suicide.' The Brief
explicitly rejects the moral relevance of the distinction be-
tween the patient's refusing medical care and the physi-
cian's acts facilitating death. The only relevant issue,
Dworkin argues, is whether the action or inaction "aims at
death." This is another example of an effort to influence the
contours of the law with ill considered philosophical argu-
ments." Fortunately, the Supreme Court ruled nine votes
to zero that the lower courts (as well as the philosophers)
44. Lee v. State, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997) (permanent injunction against
enforcement of act vacated for lack of standing and case remanded).
45. Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS 41 (Mar. 27, 1997).
46. See George P. Fletcher, Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief-An
Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 45 (May 29, 1997) (responding to Dworkin et al.,
supra note 45).
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were wrong."' The distinction between facilitating the death
of another and refusing medical care bears a compelling
political and moral truth that we would disregard at our
peril.
As a matter of political theory, there is little doubt about
the critical distinction between state action and state inac-
tion. The entire edifice of American constitutional law rests
on the distinction. The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from affirmatively violating
the rights of citizens; it does not prohibit states from pas-
sively tolerating these violations on the initiative of other
citizens. Of course, the distinction is difficult to draw in
many cases, and many critics complain that it is sometimes
applied with morally dubious consequences.' The distinc-
tion may resist easy application, but exist it does. There
would have been great irony in a Supreme Court holding
that a distinction constituting the very foundation of consti-
tutional law was irrational.
As a matter of libertarian political thinking, the distinc-
tion between failing to aid others and interfering in their
rights proves to be of cardinal importance. The libertarian
spirit of Kant's philosophy of law led him to favor liberty
under the law over the dictates of morality. The moral duty
to rescue others in distress would not have applied in his
scheme designed to protect liberty under law. Those who
argue from Kant's moral philosophy to conclusions about
duties to rescue under the law confusingly conflate moral
principles with legal and political philosophy.'
Mistaken philosophical claims about acts and omissions
have much in common with the errors we encountered in
examining the efforts to equate attempted crimes with ac-
tual crimes. Skepticism both about the distinction between
acts and omissions and about the distinction between at-
tempts and completed crimes derives from the same root
47. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
48. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
49. For an example of this confusion, see an article by an otherwise careful
legal philosopher, Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J.
247(1980).
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misconception. Both are premised on a dubious moral the-
ory that takes bad intentions to be the core of immoral con-
duct. This view of morality would be influential only if
theorists committed the additional mistake of failing to in-
tegrate political theory into their views of just punishment.
It should be clear, I think, that the future of criminal
theory rests on an adequate appreciation of both moral and
political philosophy. It is after all the state that seeks to
inflict punishment. Without a view about the proper rela-
tionship of the state to its citizens, moral theories about
crime and punishment can lead us astray.
Despite these mistaken uses of philosophy in criminal
theory, we have reason to celebrate. The field of criminal
theory, all too ignored not long ago, is now coming center
stage in the thinking of those concerned about justice in the
legal system. This Symposium itself marks a major stride
forward. The next step, one should hope, would be a set of
responses and arguments with the articles published here.
The time has come to ponder, question and criticize the ba-
sic use of state power to punish those who engage in wrong-
doing against others. I
I congratulate the Buffalo Criminal Law Review for
bringing together these articles and contributing to the as-
cendency of criminal theory.
